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CHAPTER I 
IN'!RODUCTION 
The peculiar position of the Judiciary in the United 
States is a source of wonderment and an occasion ot com-
ment for Constitutional Law students the world over. 
Alexis de Tocqueville claimed that the Judiciary was the 
distinguishing note of American Democracy. The reaaon tor 
this statement and the essence of the distinction lies in 
the tact that American judges founded their decisions on 
the uonatitution and not on mere laws.l This implies 
that a constitution is something above other laws, that 
it baa a note of supremacy and that governmental activity 
has its source and its legality from a conformity with the 
Constitution. Naturally someone or some gr~up has to in-
terpret the Constitution. In this country, from its in-
fancy, this task fell to the courts. Their main job was 
to point out whether this or that law conformed with the 
Supreme Law ot the land embodied in the Constitution. This 
is quite different from the system in England. For there 
the Parliament is supreme and is the chief source of 
1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, A. A. Knopf, 
New York, 1945, 1, 100 
1 
2 
authority. Its supremacy is unquesUoned and its word 
is law. When this principle of Parliamentary supremacy 
was forced upon tne volonies before the Revolution, 
they bucked like fiery colts and in so doing brought down 
the wrath of the English. For anyone who would not 
accept so fundamental a British political principle was 
no Britisher at all, but a rebel. Instead of looking to 
Parliament, the Colonists looked to the charters and claimed 
that these and the King were their source of authority and 
guide in political action. These charters stipulated the 
powers the Colonial legislatures were to exercise and 
preserved for posterity the written agreement between the 
King and the Colonists. It is a matter of history that the 
Colonial legislatures were subject to Judicial review trom 
the time of their settlement. If a Colonial legislature 
violated a charter provision, such a violation was de-
clared unconstitutional by the colonial courts. These 
judgments, in turn, could be appealed to the Privy Council 
in England. This august body had an auxiliary group 
called the Committee on the Privy Council for Appeals, 
whose function equivalated that of the Supreme Court today. 
This body set the stage for one of the most important con• 
stitutional cases in American Constitutional History, 
Marbury v. Madison, 1803, which shall be discussed at 
3 
length 1n this essay. The constitutional charter o£ 
Connecticut, £or example, read that any law o£ its legis-
lature "should not be contrary- to laws o£ England11 .2 
Connecticut, however, passed a law which stated that the 
oldest son should receive a double portion o£ inheritance, 
while all other children should receive an equal share. 
This, of course, was quite at variance with the law of 
primogeniture in England which insisted that the oldest 
son receive the entire share o£ the inheritance. A Judge 
Winthrop died and his children shared his property accord-
ing to the law o£ Connecticut. But the oldest son was 
not satisfied with the apportionment and took his complaint 
to court. His plea was rejected in the Courts o£ Connecti-
cut, where the case of Winthrop v. Lechmere_went down in 
history in favor of the State o£ Connecticut.3 Winthrop 
hastened to the Committee o£ the Privy Council on 
Appeals, which body decided that the legislative act of 
Connecticut on inheritance had violated the Connecticut 
charter and therefore was unconstitutional. 
With this judicial tradition, it is not surprising 
2 B. J. Hendrick, Bulwark o£ the Republic, Littl~Brown 
and Co., Boston 1937, 95 
3 ~., 95 
4 
to find that the framers of the constitution intended 
that the courts should exercise final jurisdiction on the 
constitutionality of legislative acts of Congress. Four 
outstanding authors of American Constitutional History, 
quoted at length throughout this paper, show us more con-
clusivel~ bow many of the framers were of this precise 
mentality.4 Professor Edward c. Corwin gives us a complete 
resume of the attitude of the men of the Convention of 
1787 on this subject. He saysa 
Nor can there be much doubt that the 
members of the convention were also sub-
stantially agreed that the Supreme Court 
was endowed with the further right to 
pass upon the constitutionality of acts 
of Congress. The available evidence 
strictly contemporaneous with the 
framing and ratification of the Con-
stitution show us seventeen of the 
fifty-five members of the Convention 
asserting the existence of this pre-
rogative in unmistakable terms and only 
three using language that can be con-
strued to the contrary. More striking 
than that, however, is the fact that 
these seventeen include fully three 
fourths of the leaders of the Convention, 
four of the five members of the Committee 
of Detail which drafted the Constitution 
and four of the five members of the 
Committee of Style which gave the Con-
stitution its final form.5 
4 They include Albert Beveridge, Charles Beard, Professor 
Edward S. Corwin and Charles Warren. Those who are 
opposed include Louis Boudin, Chief Justice Walter Clark 
and William Trickett. 
5 E. s. Corwin, John Marshall and the Constitution, The 
Chronicle of America Series, Yale University Preas, New 
Haven, 1919, XVI, 11 
5 
To many students of American History, the change 
in American governmental officials from the conservative 
element of washington, James Wilson and John Adams, to 
the liberal spirit of Jefferson, Madison,6 and Jackson, 
has been an enigma. There is a difficulty in understand-
ing how our way of life could continue more or leas the 
same under the influence of men whose fundamental political 
tenets were so different. This study will attempt to 
show that the unity of American life from 1787 to 1835 
was mainly due to the conservative principles of the Fed-
eralist Party; more in particular, it will deal with the 
man who was chiefly responsible tor building this spirit 
ot national unity from the blueprints of the Constitution. 
We will see how the Marbury Case, the McCulloch Case and 
the Dartmouth College Case,. along with other related cases, 
the living monument to the genius of John Marshall, Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Cqurt from 1801 until 1835, pre~ 
served the spirit of national unity throughout America. 
6 Ibid., 12 
CHAPTER II 
THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SETTING 
OF MARSHALL'S THREE MOST IMPOR-
TANT CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS 
MARBURY V. MADISON 
The year 1800 found two opposing forces striving 
for leadership in the American government. The Federalist 
party was one force. It controlled the reins through the 
steady hands of John Adams, second President of the United 
States, and John Marshall, Secretary of State and soon 
to be appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The 
Federalists favored a policy of strong national government, 
as was evidenced by Adams• Alien and Sedition Acts. 
Hamilton, too, from his writings 1n the Federalist, can 
be categorized as an advocate of strong national govern-
ment. '!his party voiced its sentiments in the famous 
Kentucky and Virginia Resolves written by 1~amas Jefferson 
and James Madison respectively. These men were chiefs 
of the opposition; they strongly advocated the right of 
the indiv~dual state to interpret the constitutionality 
of.Congressional acts. 
When it became evident, after the elections of 1800, 
6 
7 
that the Federalists had suffered a crushing defeat at the 
polls, last minute preparations were made by the Federalists 
to saddle the country w1 th a judiciary that favored a 
strong central government. 1 
The Federal court during this adolescent stage of 
the Constitution was probably the most unpopular branch 
of the Federal government. The life tenure of the judges, 
the presumption of the Courts to pass on the constitution-
ality of the law, and the arrogance of some of the federal 
judges irritated the Republicans. More than that, there 
was real hostility to the courts as such. The general 
poverty, the poor markets, the want of a sound financial 
system, the Republican sentiments of freedom and equality 
of men, and the jealousy of the National Government that 
bad seated Jefferson, made the whole machinery of the 
courts hatetul to the dominant element in politics. ~here 
had been unanimous dissatisfaction with the Judiciary Act 
of 1789. Some go so far as to say it pleased only one 
man, Ellsworth, the author of the bill.2 The Federalists 
now prepared to nullity this act by proposing a bill of 
their own. ~e Supreme Court was no longer to go on cir-
1 J. E. Cotton, Jr. The Constitutional Decisions of John 
Marshall, G. P. Putnam and Sons, New York, 1905, 1, 3 
2 Beveridge, III, 53 
8 
cuit. Six circuit and twenty-two district courts were 
established and new judgeships created. On February 27, 
1801, a new act conferring forty-two justiceships for the 
District of Columbia ~d Alexandria was passed. ~~e Senate 
confirmed the appointment on March 3, and "on that night 
the commission was signed by Adams and sealed by Marshall, 
then Secretary of state and newly appointed Chief Justice.•3 
But the commissions were not delivered. Craigmyle says 
that "by an inadvertence• they were not delivered.4 Bev-
eridge is more explicit, and gives adequate proof that due 
to Marshall's "customary negligence of details, he failed 
to deliver the commissions to the appointees. Instead 
he left them on his desk ••• "5 When Jefferson was in-
augurated, he directed Madison, as Secretary of State, 
to issue commissions to twenty-five of the persons 
appointed by Adams, but to withhold the commissions from 
the other seventeen.S This action was held by all to be 
erroneous, but still the President refused to comply.7 
Among those whose commissions were withheld were 
3 Ibid., 4 
4 ~Craigmyle, John Marshall 1n Diplomacy and Law., c. 
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1933, 113 
5 A.J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, Houghton, 
6 Mufflin Co., Boston, 1919, lll, 124 Ibid., 180 
7 or;!gmyle, 113 
• • • 
9 
William Marbury, Dennis Ramsey, Robert Townshend and 
William Harper. These four men applied to the Supreme 
court for a writ of mandamus, compelling Madison to de-
liver their commissions. The other thirteen did not join 
in the suit, apparently considering the office of Justice 
of the Peace too insignificant to be worth the expense of 
litigation. a 
When the application of Marbury and his associates 
came before Marshall, he assumed jurisdiction, and in 
December, 1801, issued the usual rule to Madison, ordering 
him to show cause at the next term of the Supreme Court 
why the writ of mandamus Should not be awarded against 
him. Soon afterwards, Congress abolished the June session 
of the Supreme Court. When the Court again opened in Feb-
ruary, 1803, the ease of Marbury v. Madison was still pend-
ing. 
Marshall was determined to make use of his seemingly 
unimportant litigation to establish an essential power of 
the Supreme court 1n the country, namely, to declare in-
valid acts of Congress that violate the Constitution.9 
~e unimportance of Marbury's commission is emphasized by 
8 Beveridge III 160 
9 Ibid., III 
10 
Craigmyle. He claims that the issue between the litigants 
•was only a trivial aff&ir". Mr. Beveridge tells us that 
so far as practical results were concerned, the case of 
Marbury v. Madison was "of no consequence whatever to any-
one". 
It is to be noted that the aid of the Court was in-
voked on the ground that an act of Congress authorized 
that Court "to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted 
by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed 
by or persons holding office under the authority of the 
United States•.lO 
Two questions were involved in this ease, according 
to the seeing eye of John Marshall. The first was whether 
the authority thus given to the Supreme Court by the act 
to issue writs of mandamus to public officers was warranted 
by the Constitution. The second was a corollary of the 
first. If the authority was not warranted, was the court 
competent to declare void the act which undertook to eon• 
fer the authority.ll 
The decision of the case turned on the point whether 
10 A. B. Magruder, John Marshall, Houghton, Mifflin and 
Co., Boston, 1899, 181 
11 Ibid., 181 
............ 
11 
the Supreme Court had power to issue a writ, inasmuch as 
the Constitution gave to the court no original jurisdiction 
in such a case. The Judiciary Act, in so far as it 
attempted to increase the jurisdiction, conflicted with the 
Constitution and was void. The actual decision, then, was 
against Marbury and l~ted and restrained the qourt from 
exercising the power Congress had granted to it. What 
stung Jefferson and the Republicans however, was Marshall's 
opinion on the illegality of the writ. Jefferson considered 
this •writ of mandamus" as an insult to the president and 
the symbol of "judicial arrogance•.l2 Such a contrast 
to anticipated procedure on the part of Marshall in de-
claring the writ void was a blow to the hopes of Jefferson. 
For the leader of the Republican party and the choice of 
the people had concocted a plan to eliminate undemocratic 
Federalism entirely from the American government. The in• 
fluenee of the Nationalist leaders had been reduced to a 
minimum by the will of the majority in both the executive 
and legislative branch of the government. The judicial 
branch now was the only hope of men like Adams, Marshall 
and James Wilson, who were using all their ingenuity to 
preserve the spirit of the leaders of the Federal Con-
12 Hendrick, 182 
12 
vention in the new government of the United States. 
Jefferson reasoned that since the majority indicated their 
will in the elections of 1800, and since the essence of 
democracy was in doing the will of the majority, was it 
not inconsistent to have the spirit of the nation blocked 
by the federal judges! Jefferson had taken the first step 
1n the process of elimination by refUsing to send the com-
missions to seventeen justices appointed by Adams. After 
that, he and the party were ready to take a slightly more 
drastic step. By a series of impeachments it was possible 
to remove important Federalist judges and fill their shoes 
by appointing judges of the Republican creed. The process 
started at the beginning of the Congressional session of 
1803 when the House impeached John Pickering, Judge of the 
United States District Court for the District of New 
Hampshire. The spirit was catching, for the newly elected 
Republican House in Pennsylvania impeached Judge Alexander 
Allison. Now Anti-federalists were setting their hearts 
on the removal of samuel Chase from the bench. 
Jefferson's reasoning regarding the Marbury Case 
was logical. Marshall naturally would decide the case in 
favor of Marbury, so that as many Federal appointees might 
hold office as was possible. But his decision would boom-
erang, for in attempting to secure the reign of the Fed-
13 
eralists in the judiciary_ Marshall would give grounds for 
impeachment, lose the key position tor the Federalists, 
and go down in ignominious judicial defeat. 
Marshall was aware that he was liable to impeachment. 
However there was something he teared even more than ~­
peachment, and that was the man Jefferson would appoint 1n 
his place, Roane of Virginia, a dyed 1n the wool Republican. 
Without a doubt the principles of Federalism, to which he 
was devoting his life, would give way to those of Republican 
State Sovereignty. Under this pressure Marshall conceived 
the greatest Supreme Court solution in our history. He 
stunned Jefferson because in one sense, he solved the 
ease in Jefferson's favor. Jefferson complained about 
the writ of mandamus. This writ was the sign of judicial 
arrogance - and Marshall in Marbury v. Madison denied 
the power of the Supreme Court to use such a writ and 
thus sided with Jefferson. But herein lay the genius of 
the solution because 1n admitting this point at the same 
time he denied the power of Congress to confer such juris-
diction on the Supreme Court. And in denying Congress• 
power to confer such a jurisdiction, Marshall secured for 
posterity the right of the supreme Court to pass on the 
constitutionality of acts of Congress. The tables were 
14 
completely overturned. Jefferson had to scuttle his plans 
while the Federalist flag waved victoriously in the wind. 
McCULLOCH V • MARYLAND 
The First Bank of the United States, designed by 
Alexander Hamilton, functioned well during the first twelve 
years of its existence. It was managed according to high 
banking standards, and contributed its share in maintaining 
the national credit.l3 It served as a clearing house for 
the government and, without cost, transacted all business 
pertaining to the funds of the government. 1~e First 
Bank of the United States did not yield to the temptation 
of overspeculation but kept a level head in the execution 
of its fUnctions and duties. But despite this rather en-
vious record, there arose an antagonistic attitude towards 
this national corporation. T.bis spirit was concomitant 
with the coming of the Republicans to power. Jefferson 
insisted that the project was unconstitutional. Madison 
in the first Congress had opposed the bill to incorporate 
the First Bank of the United States. According to him, 
Congress had no power to create corporations.l4 However, 
as Mr. Beveridge remarks, the greatest objection to a 
13 Beveridge, IV, 171 
14 ~., 172 
15 
national bank was that it was a monopruy inconsistent with 
tree 1nstitutions.l5 
Jefferson voiced his opinion against the national 
bank twelve years after its institution, and in the 
third year of his presidency. He said: 
This institution is one of the most 
deadly hostility~i~ existing against 
principles and forms of our Constitu-
tion. An institution like this pen-
etrating by its branches every part of 
the Union, acting by command and in 
phalanx, may in a critical moment, 
upset the government ••• What an ob-
struction could not this Bank of the 
U~ted States with all i~s branch 
banks, be in time of war? 
The fact that two thirds of the Bank's stock was 
owned in England did not add to its popularity with 
Americans.l7 Unconstitutionality and "foreign ownership" 
were pet phrases of the agents and friends of state banks.l8 
The state banks, eager for the profits of the National Bank 
and its branches, •chafed under the wise regulation of 
their note issues ••• •l9 The Virginia State Bank, for ex-
ample, practically had a banking monopoly and was eager 
to become the depository of national funds.20 Besides, 
.15 Ibid., 172 
16 'Ibid., 172 
17 ibid., 172 (ff.) 
18 Ibid. , 172 
~8 ~·~ 173 a., 174 
16 
Federalists were in charge of these National Banks and 
their branches, while Republicans controlled the reins 
-
of the government. At the same time, the state banks had 
control of the newspapers, and had successfully stirred 
up considerable antagonism against their rival, the National 
Bank. 
On the very threshold of the War of 1812, the National 
Bank was voted down by a majority of one vote in the Senate 
and House. While foreign ships steamed out of New York 
Harbor with large quantities of specie belonging to foreign 
banks, restrictions on state banks were released. Within 
a short time, these same state banks abused their liberty 
and were operating "with unrestrained license•.21 
Two years of war without a National Bank forced the 
administration to admit that if it were going to conduct 
the war successfully, it had to have another Bank of the 
United States. But when it came to a concrete plan of 
execution, the Republican administration was "stymied" •. 
Then, when the war was over, Madison "timidly" suggested 
that Congress set up another National Bank, in order that 
the country might once more enjoy the benefits of a 
21 Ibid., 176 
17 
"uniform currency".22 
By 1816 the country found itself 1n a deplorable 
financial condition. The nation was flooded with a de• 
based paper currency, issued by hundreds of banks which 
were free from restraint as well as irresponsible. The 
nation was still prostrate because the war had disrupted 
her commerce and curtailed her production. As a result 
the National Bank advocates had little trouble in in-
corporating a United States Bank to effect the resumption 
of specie payments and to establish a stable paper currency. 
But the economic disaster was not to be so easily remedied. 
Specie payments were resumed and the volume of debased 
currency lessened but the Bank was hated as badly as ever. 
It was blamed for the increasing depression and hard times.23 
On April 10, 1816, the Second Bank of the United 
states was chartered, but this ttme a majority of the 
directors were Republicans. ln that year there were 246 
state banks, whereas in 1811, there were about 80 of 
these banks, and only 3 in 1800.24 In 1816, 21 banks 
were chartered in the thinly populated state of Ohio. !n 
1818, 43 new banks were authorized in Kentucky. All 
22 Ibid., 180 
23 cotton, 302 
24 Beveridge, IV 178 
18 
kinds of companies like "bridge companies, manufacturing 
companies and mercantile companies" were authorized to 
issue bills. Private banks sprang up and did business 
without any restraint. "Nothing more was necessary to 
start a banking busine.ss than plates, presses and paper". 25 
Notes current in one part of the country were refused or 
taken at a large discount 1n another. Beveridge quotes 
Niles to the effect that there were not "half a dozen 
banks 1n the United States that are able to pay their 
debts as they are payable".26 Beveridge quotes the same 
authority as saying that in August, 1818 "the notes of at 
least one hundred banks in the United States are counter-
feited•.27 
Into such a picture stepped the Second Bank of the 
United States. In the beginning it was guilty of many 
blunders and of corruption; it over-issued and increased 
inflation; it lavishly accomodated borrowers; 1n many 
cases branch officers and directors issued notes as reck-
lessly as did some of the state banks.28 
Yet these branches did retuse to accept bills of 
25 ~., 
26 d Ibi ., 27-Ibid., 
28 ills!·, 
192 
194 
196 
197 
19 
notoriously unsound local banks, while they accumulated 
an enormous amount of state bank bills. They were well 
disposed to extend unending indulgence to the state banks 
and other borrowers, but they were finally compelled by 
the parent bank to demand payment of loans and redemption 
of bills of local banks which they held. When the branch 
banks carried out their orders, those sections of the 
country paid most dearly where the excesses of state bank-
ing were most notorious, for in those sections the col-
lection of debts came like the plague in the night. 
On August 28, 1818, the branches were directed to 
retuse all notes except their own.29 Thus the bank 
"like an abandoned mother ••• bastardized its offspring", 
said the critics of the National Bank, among whom could 
be included all state banks and most of the people.30 
The National Bank was reducing the currency while the 
state banks and the people were clamoring for more cur-
rency. Bankruptcy Showedits face on the horizon like a 
dreaded disease. Once more Mr. Beveridge quotes Niles: 
"Never ••• have any ••• laws been more productive of crime 
than the insolvent laws of Maryland". One issue of the 
29 Ibid., 199 
30 Ibid., 201 
............ 
20 
Federal Gazette (Maryland) contained six columns of bank-
ruptcy notices.31 
In 1818 John Quincy Adams testified that: 
OUr greatest real evil is the question 
between debtor and creditor, into which 
the banks have plunged us deeper than 
would have been possible without them. 
The bank debtors are everywhere so 
numerous and powerful that they con-
trol the newspapers throughout the 
Union and give the discussions a turn 
extremely erroneous and prostrate every 
principle of political economy.32 
The states seemed to have one weapon against what many 
people sincerely thought was their enemy. That was tax-
ation. T.hey would tax the Second Bank of the United 
States out of existence. The blows against sovereign 
states should be warded off by weapons appropriate to 
such states.33 
Indiana's first Constitution prohibited any bank 
chartered outside the state from doing business within 
its borders. Shortly after the National Bank opened its 
doors in 1817, Maryland passed an act taxing the Baltimore 
branch $15,000.00 annually. Seven months later the 
legislature of Tennessee enacted a law that any bank 
31 Ibid., 201 
32 Ibid., 205 
33 Ibid., 207 
........... 
21 
chartered under its authority would pay $50,000.00 each 
year for the privilege of banking in that state. A month 
later Georgia placed a special tax on the Second Bank of 
the United States and so did Illinois, North Carolina, 
Kentucky and Oh1o. 34 Such legislation seemed to forecast 
the extinction of the Second Bank of the United States. 
But laws and great documents, as well as great men, are the 
fruit of crises, and this financial crisis was not an ex-
ception, for it produced the masterpiece of judicial de-
cision known as the McCulloch v. Maryland Case. 
The actual case of McCulloch v. Mariland arose out 
of an attempt on the part of the State of Maryland to tax 
the operations of the branch bank of the United States in 
the city of Balt~ore. The State of Maryland in 1818 
passed an act requiring all notes issued by banks not 
operating by authority of the state to be issued on 
stamped paper.35 If these requirements were not met, a 
tax of $15,000.00 had to be pa~. The Baltimore Branch 
Bank issued its notes on unstamped paper and at the same 
time refused to recognize the authority of the State of 
34 Ibid., 207 
35 Cotton., 302 
22 
Maryland, by refusing to pay the $15,000.00 tax. On May 
8, 1818, James William McCulloch, the cashier of the 
Baltimore Branch Bank was sued for the •recovery of the 
penalties prescribed by the State of Maryland".36 The 
case centered around the constitutionality of the act of 
the State of Maryland as applied to the National Branch 
Bank in Baltimore. The case came directly before the 
Supreme Court •on appeal•37 or on an •agreed case•.38 
We shall examine the case more in detail on pages 43 to 47 and 
72 to 78. 
TRUSTEES OF DARTMOU'lli COLLEGE V. WOODWARD 
On December 13, 1769, Eleazar Wheelock was granted 
a charter for his school by John Wentworth, Royal Governor 
of the Province of New Hampshire. The charter established 
Dartmouth College for the education of Indians to be gov-
erned by •one body corporate and politick" by the 
Trustees of Dartmouth College. The Trustees were given 
a completely free hand in conducting the institution; 
Wheelock was made President of the College and given power 
to appoint his successor. The .charter stipulated that the 
38 Beveridge, 283 37 Cotton, 302 
38 Beveridge, IV, 224 
23 
"trustees and their successors forever, or the major part 
of any seven or more of them convened" were to make all 
laws, rules and regulations for the College. They were 
also given the power to remove and choose a President of 
the College and fill any vacancy on the Board of Trustees 
occasioned by death, removal or any other cause. Dartmouth 
College was established and governed for nearly a half a 
century under this charter. In 1799, Eleazar Wheelock 
died; he willed that John Wheelock, his son, should succeed 
-as President. 
In 1793, Nathaniel Niles, a lawyer, was elected one 
of the Trustees. He had studied theology under Dr. Joseph 
Bellamy, who had engaged in bitter religious contro~ersies 
with the elder Wheelock, for Bellamy was a Congregationalist, 
Wheelock a Presbyterian. Niles and the younger Wheelock 
inherited these religious differences from tutor and 
parent. Niles gradually acquired superior influence over 
the Trustees and thereafter, no friend of President 
Wheelock was elected to the Board. Wheelock, perturbed 
by the new turn of events, drew down upon himself the wrath 
of the Board when he asked the state legislature to investi-
gate the conduct of the College. The people of the state 
instinctively took s~des over this controversy regarding 
the only college in their state. Pamphlets were the means 
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chosen by both sides to express their feelings and to win 
support. Wheelock himself was the first to plead his 
cause. When another p~phlet appeared in favor of the 
Wheelock taction, 1n quick order two appeared in favor of 
the opposition. These pamphlets naturally found their 
way among the people and helped to bring the controversy 
to a head. On August 26, 1815, the Trustees removed 
Wheelock from office. Reverend Francis Brown of Yarmouth, 
Maine, was elected Wheelock's successor by the same Board 
two days later. 
The political parties soon found themselves on 
opposing sides, the Federalists leaning to the side of the 
Trustees, the Republicans to the side of Wheelock. ~hen, 
with the election of William Plumer, an anti-federalist 
to the governorship of New Hampshire, and the securing 
of a majority 1n the legislature by the Republicans, a 
new political turn occurred. Governor Plumer, 1n his 
message to the legislature said that he detected a 
monarchical tinge in the charter of Dartmouth College, 
which he thought hostile to free government. Since Dart-
mouth College was founded for the public good, Plumer 
argued that the state had every right to amend and improve 
its charter.39 As a result of this message the legislature 
39 
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passed an act changing the nam.e of Dartmouth College to 
Dartmouth University, increased the Trustees from 12 to 
21, and created a Board of Overseers with veto power over 
the acts of the Trustees. When the old Trustees refused 
to recognize these new provisions, the Governor and his 
council of state set up a new university. 
In the meantime two members of the old Trustees 
went to work drawing up a defense of their position. 
These men, Thomas w. Thompson and Asa MacFarland by name, 
really foreshadowed the work of Daniel Webster when they 
based their argument on the fact that Dartmouth College 
was the result of a contract between the State and the 
twelve trustees. This contract entitled the Trustees to 
rights and privileges which the State was bound to respect. 
The final step in the controversy and the beginning 
of theDartmouth College Case, began when William H. Wood-
ward, Secretary and Treasurer of Dartmouth College, who 
had in his possession the original charter, the College 
seal, and the record books, sided with the University. 
The Trustees of the College sued him for what they claimed 
was their property. By mutual agreement between the 
litigants, the case was taken to the Court of Appeals of 
the State of New Hampshire. Then the Dartmouth College 
26 
Trustees, losing the case in the Superior Court of New 
Hampshire, appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 
states.40 The Superior Court of Appeals had decided 
against the College on the basis that a corporation whose 
•tranchises are exercised for public purposes, is a 
publick corporation" and that a gift to such a corporation 
"is in reality a gift to the publick". The Court claimed 
that the office of Trustee of Dartmouth College was as 
much a public trust as the office of governor or judge. 
Chief Justice Richardson, in delivering his opinion said 
that it was against sound policy "to place great institu-
tions of learning within the absolute control of a few 
individuals and out of the control of the sovereign 
power ••• •41 
Immediately the case was taken to the Supreme Court 
of the United States by Writ of Error which assigned the 
violation of the National Constitution by the College Acts 
as the ground for appeal. Daniel Webster and Joseph 
Hopkinson of Philadelphia argue~ the case for the College 
Trustees, while John Holmes, a Representative in Congress 
from Massachusetts, and William Wirt, Attorney-General 
40 Haines, 391 
41 Beveridge, IV 236 
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of the United States, appeared for the University. The 
ease began on March 10, 1818. 
Showing that Dartmouth College was an eleemosynary 
corporation, Webster went as far back as the Magna Carta 
to show the protection to which such a corporation was en-
titled. He hit against the right of New Hampshire in 
legislating against Dartmouth College, by asking the 
questions •What is the meaning of the words 'no state 
shall pass any ••• law impairing the obligation of eontracts'"?42 
Webster went on to show that Madison was on the side of the 
College. In the Federalist, Number 44, Madison clearly 
stated that "such laws (impairing the obligation of con-
tracts) are contrary to the first principles of the social 
compact, and to every sound principle of.legislation•.43 
Madison went on to say that •our own experience has taught 
'us ••• that additional fences should be built against 
spoliations ot personal security and private rights".44 
Further authority was the Supreme Court itself in the 
Fletcher v. Peck Case when it decl~red that "a grant is a 
contract, ••• and a grant by a state is also a contract, as 
42 Ibid. , 245 
43 H. c. Lodge, ed., The Federalist, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 
New York, 1902, 279 
44 llli· , 245 
,..... 
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much as the grant of an individual".45 
At eleven o'clock on March 13, 1818, the morning 
after the argument was concluded, Marshall announced that 
because of the indecision ot some of the judges, the case 
had to be continued. Finally, after a deliberation of 
' 
three days, the Chief Justice announced that the Court 
had decided that the agreement between the State of New 
Hampshire and the Trustees of Dartmouth College was a eon-
tract "the obligation of which cannot be impaired without 
violating the Constitution of the U:nited States". 46 
45 
Ibid., 246 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE THREE DECISIONS 
Charles Grove Haines in his recent book, The Role 
of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics 
from 1789-1835, devotes a portion of his first chapter to 
the process of judicial interpretation. Since some of his 
opinions laid down in this section are opposed to those 
we shall try to demonstrate in this essay, it will help to 
clarity our position by quoting from Mr. Haines. The 
keynote of Mr. Haines' theory regarding the process of jud-
icial interpretation is found on the title page of the 
book. There he quotes Chief Justice Hughes as saying: 
•we are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what 
the Judges say it is•. In giving his reader the meaning 
of words in judicial decisions, Mr. Haines quotes Chief 
Justice Holmes as sayingJ 
A word is not a crystal, transparent 
and unchanged, it is the skin of living 
thought and may vary greatly in color 
and content according to the circum-
stance and time in which it is used.l 
Finally he gives us a set of opposing quotations, one from 
Chief Justice Marshall and the other from Justice Cardozo. 
1 Haines, 28. 
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Justice Cardozo denies the contention of Marshall that the 
judge has no will in any case except the "will of the law", 
when he observes that: 
he (Marshall) gave to the Constitution 
of the United States the impress of his 
own mind; and the form of our constitu-
tional law is what it is because he 
moulded it while it was still plastic 
and malleable in the fire of his own 
intense convictians.2 
Our duty is to go one step farther and to show that 
Marshall's intense convictions were nothing more than the 
spirit of the conservative element that was so influential 
in the Federal Con.vention of 1787. We shall try to show 
that these two apparently opposing quotations are really 
in agreement, for Marshall's intense convictions were the 
same as the spirit of the predominating element of the con-
vention and therefore the "will of the law". And in place 
of the conviction that the •constitution is what the 
Judges say it is", we shall give evidence from John 
Marshall's three cases treated in the first chapter, that 
Marshall favored Justice Sutherland, who, when speaking 
about the words of the Constitution, said; "Their meaning 
is changeless; it is only their application which is ex-
2 Ibid., 39 
3 Ibide 1 40 
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Alexis de Tocqueville, keen student of American 
governmental institutions, 1n his book, Democracy 1n 
America, notes some characteristics of judicial power in 
general. One of them is the duty of arbitration. "But", 
he says, •rights must be contested 1n order to warrant the 
interference of a tribunal. As long as a law is uncontested, 
the judicial authority is not called upon to discuss it ••• n4 
Chief Justice Marshall above all else, was a Federalist. 
He lived that he might make operative the federal prin-
ciples laid down 1n the Convention of 1787, reiterated 
and developed in the Federalist Papers of Hamilton, and 
echoed in the debates leading up to the Judiciary Act of 
1802. His mind was a practical one, and a patient one. 
He must bide his time and wait for the psychological 
opening to put into execution the fundamental tenets of 
the Federalist party. Since "as long as a law is un-
contested, the Judicial authority is not called on to dis-
cuss it", Marshall had to use every bit of intellectual 
acumen to see in cases that came before his court, an 
opportunity to advance his cause.5 
However, before we look into the particular cases 
that did so much to establish a national government in the 
~ de Tocqueville, 99 
Haines, 43 
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united States, let us see what the political contestants 
were fighting about during the in~ancy of our American 
Republic. 
G. K. Chesterton would have taken great delight in a 
study of the principles of Federalism and Republicanism 
during the formative years of American democracy, for he 
relished paradoxes. we are about to see how opposing 
fundamental theories of government, postulated on the one 
hand by Hamilton, James Wilson and John Marshall and on 
the other by Jefferson, Randolph and Sherman, constitute 
the body and soul of our political heritage. Hamilton, 
interested in property rights and bent on safeguarding 
minority claims, would eliminate the insecurity of the 
minority by creating •a will in the community independent 
of the $ajority".6 Safety, discipline, prosperity and 
happiness would be part of our society, provided there 
existed a system of laws, supreme in their nature, with 
their source in the people, yet irresponsive to the 
ephemeral and sometimes contradictory desires of the 
people. An aristocratic democracy, a government of all 
the citizens, for all the citizens, by the most capable 
of the citizens, was what the Federalist wanted for the 
United states. We shall see how the Federalist champions 
6 Haines, 197 
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pooled their interests to stamp an indelible mark of 
•national" in the spirit of our political tradition. 
Hamilton's contribution to the Federalist stock Company 
was a clear cut notion of the importance of fixed national 
institutions in the preservation of a sound financial 
system. This conviction was embodied in his cabinet opinion 
on the establishment of a National Bank, a document which 
caused President washington to decide in favor of the 
Bank, contrary to the suggestions of two other cabinet 
members, Jefferson and Randolph. 7 Wilson~ interests in 
the Company were represented by a masterful defense of the 
"consolidated government• in the Pennsylvania State Con-
vention, immediately following the Federal Convention, as 
well as by public speeches, pamphlets, and lectures which 
boosted the Federalist cause. John Marshall, refusing to 
gamble on the will of the majority because of the American 
people's refUsal to pay their debts to England at the end 
of the Revolutionary war, and because of the fear of 
popular revolt due to Shay's Rebellion, cast his lot with 
the Federalists and enhanced their cause by giving them the 
greatest judicial mind the Supreme Court has ever had.s 
An aristocratic democracy, but nevertheless a real 
7 H. c. Lodge, ed., The works of Alexander Hamilton, G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, Constitutional Edition, New York (no date) 
III, 493 8 Corwin, 231 
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democracy, was the preoccupation of the early Federalists. 
All government had its source in the people, all govern-
ment was executed for the people and by the people. The 
Constitution was the document, the instrument through which 
the people declared their will in carrying the spirit of 
democracy into practice. This Constitution was the 
supreme law of the land and lent stability to life. In 
order that it might remain a supreme law, and not subject 
to the weaknesses of men, checks and balances and independ-
ence of departments were essential. But government, if it 
were to secure stability for society, must have the means 
within its power to protect minority rights like property 
rights and private contracts. To insure such a vital 
protection, which John Locke had said was the prime function 
of government, a unique twist was given to the function of 
the Judiciary. It was to be the bulwark of our democracy, 
the protecto~ of vested rights. Like the "General Will• 
of Rousseau, which forced the minority to be free by 
forcing it to conform to the •General Will", the Judiciary, 
by its complete independence and remoteness from the 
people, came to their aid when disputes arose over their 
interests and pointed the way to truth by a calm, de-
liberate and reasonable interpretation of their rights and 
duties. A perfectly impersonal and unbiased interpretation 
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was necessary for stability, economic prosperity and com-
munity peace. It is the genius of the American governmental 
system that de Tocqueville says distinguishes American 
democracy from other democracies.9 Based, as the 
Jeffersonian Republicans claim, on the most undemocratic 
of principles, the judicial right of interpreting the Con-
stitution is the salient characteristic of the democracy 
of democracies, the American democracy. 
Jeffersonian Republicans, on the other hand, detested 
the implication that the majority could not look after 
its own interest. Such a statement smacked of aristocracy 
and monarchy according to them and should have no part in 
American political life. This group, although it had 
its Hegel and Fichte in men like Jefferson and Madison, 
lacked its Hitler to carry its philosophic principles into 
practical realities. So Jefferson and Madison and 
Randolph tri~d to play a double role. They looked for a 
bulwark against anti-republican tendencies in the state 
governments. In the state governments they saw a check 
on the national power as well as a means to prevent undue 
influence from a •monster• national government that would 
9 de Tocqueville, 100 
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override the rights of its master, the people, just like 
Frankenstein did his own master. Repulsive to the 
Republicans was the disrespectful attitude toward the 
majority, whose will, according.to Jefferson, was law. He 
was not interested so much in the stability of government 
as he was in insuring the dominance.of the will of the 
majority. Such general phrases as, equal and exact justice 
to all men, honest friendships with all nations, support 
of state governments 1n all their rights, freedom of 
religion and freedom of the press were the strongholds of 
democracy. 
In such generalities did the Jeffersonian Republicans 
communicate their political message to the world. But 
while they shouted from the housetops.that faith in the 
will of the majority was the salvation of democracy, the 
well organized minority of Federalists went about carefully 
securing the rights of minorities. The inviolability of 
contracts was made secure by the Dartmouth College Case; 
a promise of a stable currency was looked for after the 
McCUlloch Case. The right of the states to interpret the 
Constitution and to preserve the spirit of the Constitution, 
a trump card in the hand of the Republicans, was defeated 
by the Marbury v. Madison and Fletcher v. Peck cases. 
Although the Republicans managed consistently to win 
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majorities in both the House and the senate, nevertheless 
the Federalist chiefs quietly went about sowing the seeds 
of a strong national government. Of course, the American 
public were not unaware to the situation. They were 
attracted by the high sounding phrases of the Republicans 
and enjoyed the pat on the back regarding the integrity of 
the majority, but they also knew that the boon to industry 
and commerce after the Dartmouth College Case in 1819 
did not flow from these same general principles. American 
democracy was fUnctioning for the interests of the majority 
through those acts that secured the rights of minorities. 
The paradox is brought into the open when we remember 
that the Republicans had undisputed control of the executive 
and legislative branches of the government, and a majority 
on the Supreme Court Bench in the year 1819, yet the 
McCUlloch case, decided unanimously by the Supreme Court 
Judges, interpreted the case in conformity with the 
spirit of Hamilton's Cabinet Letter to washington of Feb-
ruary 23, 1791 on the doctrine of implied powers.lO So, 
while the Jeffersonians drank deeply of the spirit of the 
French Revolution, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity and 
fascinated the American citizens to the extent of paying 
10 Lodge, III, 494 
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dividends at the polls, the Conservatives gave vitality 
to a more sober, more wise, more practical and more 
efficient democracy by passing on to posterity a national 
tradition of unity that proved its metal when tested in 
the fire of the Civil War. 
Now let us draw closer to the battlefield and watch 
the thrusts and parries of the political swordsmen. In 1802 
the Federalists suffered a crushing blow when the Repub-
licans, pushing through the Repeal Act of 1802, voted 
against the supervisory power of the Judiciary over the 
National Legislature. The debates in Congress which pre-
ceded the Repeal Act were the warning signal for the momentary 
end of the Federal principle of judicial supremacy. 
Jefferson and his party were out to stifle the new 
Judiciary Act of 1801 and to render ineffective the swan 
song of the Federalist's champion, President Adams. The 
point at issue, and the target at which the Repeal Act was 
aimed, was the power of the Supreme Court to annul acts . 
of Congress. With this . s~bling block out of the way, 
America would be a real democracy, and the flag of Re-
publicanism, so becoming to the dignity of man, would wave 
victoriously in the wind. Once again the two parties were 
drawing swords in anticipation of a later day when swords 
of steel would replace the sharp thrusts of words. However, 
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this Repeal Act did more than sink the enemy ship, for 
it laid the foundation for the Marbury decision, which 
turned the seeming Republican victory into unexpected de-
feat. There were few arguments in the Marbury case that 
were not used on the floor of Congress by the Federalists 
in their uphill battle to save Federalist principles. As 
Beveridge notes, all the reasons Marshall gave one year 
later in the Marbury Case were given during the fight over 
the Judiciary Act of 1801.11 
On January 6, 1802, Senator John Breckenridge, 
capable exponent of Republican democracy, voiced a 
fundamentaltenet of Jefferson's constitutional creed, 
when he said that the Legislature, as far as law making 
power is concerned, have exclusive right, while the 
Judges have an obligation to carry out the laws they make. 
But Gouverneur Morris, a member of the Federal Convention, 
challenged such a statement. Re remarked that according 
to Republican doctrine, •the moment the Legislature ••• 
declare themselves supreme, they become so ••• and the con-
stitution is whatever they choose to make it".l2 
James H. Bayard, who won the award for most skillful 
11 Beveridge, III, 75. 
12 Ibid., 71. 
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swordsman for the losers, said in a prophetic tones 
"Destroy the independence of the National Judiciary and 
the moment is not far when this fair country is to be 
desolated by Civil War.•l3 
John Randolph of Roanoke, one of the three full time 
members of the Federal convention of 1787 who did not sign 
the Constitution, led the House in quashing the Federalist 
judicial principle.l4 He argued that •the proper restraint 
of the'"legislature was not found in a pretended power of 
the Judiciary to veto legislation, but in the people them-
selves, who a.t the ballot box could apply the constitutional 
corrective•.l5 This, he claimed as a •true check". Every 
other one was at variance with the principle that a tree 
people are capable of self-government. In general, the 
sentiments of the Republicans in the debate, though some-
times not quite so forceful, may be summed up in the 
words of Jefferson in a letter to Mr. Jarvis, on September 
28, 1820, when he wrote that "to consider the judges as 
the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions ••• 
would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy".l6 
13 Ibid., 82 
14 At this time the House was Republican two to one, while 
the Senate had a Republican majority (ct. Beveridge, 
III, 72.) 
15 Ibid., 85 
16 Ibid. , 144 
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The upshot or the debate was a repeal or the Judiciary 
ACt or 1801. But the dereat was a blessing in disguise 
ror it made Marshall see the exigency or establishing 
rirmly in our political tradition the right or the Supreme 
court to pass on the Constitutionality of Congressional 
acts, and in so doing provoked his ramous decision in the 
Marbury v. Madison case of 1803. Marshall had issued a 
writ of mandamus to Madison in 1801, demanding that the 
secretary of State give reason why Marbury did not receive 
his commission. But the Repeal Act of 1802 abolished the 
August term of the Supreme Court, so it was not until 
February, 1803 that the case finally came to the Court. 
This power of issuing the writ of mandamus was a power 
given to the Supreme Court, not by the Constitution, but 
by Congress itself, in section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789. In this section Congress gave to the Supreme Court 
the power to issue the writ of mandamus "to any courts 
appointed or persons holding office under the authority 
of the United States ••• •l7 When Marshall issued the writ 
in 1801 there is no evidence that he intended to dispute 
the power of ~1e Supreme Court to issue such a writ. Only 
the force of the Repeal Act of 1802 seems to account for 
17 Cotton, I, 38. 
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the apparent change in procedure on the part of Marshall.l8 
Now, in 1803, the case took on a new aspect. It 
was a golden opportunity, for here was a case that claimed 
its jurisdiction from a Congressional act. Yet by what 
power did Congress pass on such a jurisdiction? It was in 
this decision of Marshall's that he judged the incompetency 
of Congress to confer such a power and thus established 
the principle that the Supreme Court had the power to 
pass on the constitutionality of acts of Congress, for 
•it is the very essence of Judicial duty ••• to determine 
if a law be in opposition to the Constitution."l9 
After the elections of 1800, the influence of the 
Federalist party in national politics waxed and waned 
until the war of 1812, when its influence was reduced to 
the barest minimum. But despite the fact that the Repub-
licans controlled both the executive and legislative branches 
of the government, Marshall was molding the minds of the 
interpreters of the Constitution along Federalist lines. 
In 1819, when the McCulloch v. Maryland Case came up, 
there were five Republican-appointed Judges on the Supreme 
Court Bench. Despite the fact that the case brought up 
18 Beveridge, III, 133. 
19 Cotton, I, 39 
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the issue of Federalism versus State Sovereignty, all 
five Republican justices concurred with Marshall in rend-
ering a unanimous decision in favor of the Federalist 
interpretation of the Constitution.20 
Adhering to the spirit of the Kentucki Resolves, 
which in no way reflected the spirit of the leaders of the 
Federal Convention of 1787, the defenders of the state of 
Maryland insisted that the Constitution flowed from the 
acts of sovereign and individual states• and received its 
power fro.m the states and not from the people. Marshall, 
ever on the watch for despoilers of the tradition of 1787, 
used the case as an instrument for projecting Federalist 
doctrine into the practical tradition of our government. 
"The government of the Union", said Marshall, "is em-
phatically and truly a government of the people. In form 
and substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted 
by them and are exercised directly on them and for their 
benefit."21 
But more to the point was the doctrine of implied 
powers versus the Jeffersonian •strict interpretation" 
principle. Marshall was ready to admit that the powers of 
the government were •enumerated". And, of course, the dif-
20 Haines, 354. 
21 Cotton; I, 312. 
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ficulty that arose and that "will probably continue to 
arise as long as our system shall exist" was the "extent 
of those powers actually granted.n22 But at least a 
principle could be laid down that would shed some light on 
the solution of the problem. "The government of the Union, 
though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere 
of action." 23 
It is true that the power to create a National Bank 
was not expressly granted to Congress by the Constitution, 
but was it not according to the spirit of the Constitution 
to argue that "a government entrusted.with such ample powers, 
on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity 
of the Nation so vitally depends, must also be entrusted 
with ample means for their execution?•24 For "the power 
being given, it is the interest of the Nation to facilitate 
its execution. It can never be their interest and cannot 
be presumed to have been their intention, to clog and em-
barass its execution by withholding the most appropriate 
means.•25 This principle is reiterated and re-echoed by 
Marshall throughout his decision. Even in more forceful 
words he says againa 
~~Ibid., 313. 
Ibid., 315 
25 Ibid., 315 
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let the end be legit~ate, let it 
be within the scope of the Consti-
tution and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited but consistent with the 
letter and spirit of the Constitu-
tion, are constitutional.26 
So far we have noted a planned exposition of the mean-
ing of the implied powers of our government, which might 
have been a part of any treatment on the significance of 
the United States government. Marshall meets the ~dvocates 
of the state of Maryland head on, however, when he speaks 
of an implied prohibition of powers relating to state gov-
ernmentsc 
the states have no power, by taxation 
or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or 
1n any manner control, the operations of 
the constitutional laws enacted by 
Congress to carry into execution the 
powers vested 1n the federal government. 
This we think the unavoidable consequence 
of that supre~cy which the Constitution 
has declared. 
In the same year, 1819, we find Chief Justice :Marshall 
deciding another of his most famous Constitutional cases, 
Dartmouth College v. woodward. Although it is one Of his 
most famous decisions, as far as practical, political and 
26 Ibid., 329. 
27 Ibid. , 344. 
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economic effects are concerned, the constitutional prin-
ciples set down, for the most part, have appeared in the 
two cases already reviewed. In 1803, in Madison v. Marbury, 
the Chief Justice established the right of the Judiciary 
to pass on the constitutionality of legislative acts. In 
the Dartmouth case he confirms that principle by denying 
the validity of the legislative act of the State of New 
Hampshire when it meddled with the Dartmouth College 
"contract•. Marshall held that the Dartmouth College 
charter was a "corporate franchise" and a "corporate 
franchise is a contract and so inviolable and beyond the 
control of the state." 
It was the Federalist principle that the Supreme 
court was the defender of the rights of the people, 
through its protection of the private contract and the 
private corporation, that encouraged the businessman to 
undertake private enterprises without fear of govern-
mental interference and that had such widespread economic 
effects. 28 Going back to the Constitution itself, Marshall 
28 w. F. Dodd, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law, 
west Publishing Co.; st. Paul, Minn., 1941, 1234. Mr. 
Dodd says that "although the Dartmouth College Case dealt 
primarily with the charters of eleemosynary corporations, 
it has been uniformly accepted since as applicable to 
the charters of all kinds of business corporations ••• ", 
1234. 
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notes tbat~he American people have said in the Consti• 
tution that 'no state shall pass ••• any law impairing the 
obligation of contracts•".29 He quotes the same document 
to the effect "that the Judicial power shall extend to 
cases in law and equity arising under the constitution•.30 
Thus we have seen that Marshall was a Supreme Court 
Justice of the Federalist mold. He decided his cases on 
definite objective principles defined and cl&rified by 
the speculative intellects of Wilson and Hamilton and 
proved pure gold in the fire of practical experience. It 
was not changing. spur-of-the-moment. subjective principles 
that Marshall applied to the Marbury, McCulloch and 
Dartmouth college cases. His philosophy and political 
principles did not change according to the "circumstances 
and tLme"• but rather they were changeless principles, 
changeless in their essence because they were based on 
man's true nature, the same today as yesterday and 
tomorrow. 
29 Cotton., I. 352. 
30 ~., 353 
CHAPTER IV 
THE THREAD OF FEDERALISM IN MARSHALL'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS. 
He~i Bergson, noted modern French philosopher, 
claimed that every great philosopher has one great in-
tuition, through which he penetrates the mysteries of 
intellectual knowledge. This great intuition is the 
foundation stone, the anchor, the alpha and omega of all 
truth for him. ~~ery other bit of reality gushes forth 
from the fountain of· this one truth and loses its identity 
in the stream of that one reality. St. Thomas Aquinas 
saw all truth in the light of being, and whether we examine 
his doctrine on Act and Potency or the Nature of Relations 
or Free Will, we shall always be able to hark back to the 
fountain head, "being", and discover a consistency of WhiCh 
few philosophers can boast. 
But this ability to see things through one idea is 
not limited to the field of philosophy. Alexander the 
Great centered his life around the conquering of the world, 
Napoleon ambitioned France and Napoleon as the rulers of 
Europe and perhaps the world. Hitler was convinced of 
the superiority of the German Race and viewed all other 
races as the handmaids of his people. John Marshall saw 
the people of the United States as a great empire, but only 
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in so far as the people were united under one strong 
national or central government.! ':L'his government must be 
free from the petty jealousies or subordinated state gov-
ernments and had to be able to act for the good or the 
whole nation, even if that action might be irksome to some. 
Reasonable principles or rights and duties did not motivate 
men when personal advantages came into play, un~ess hard 
and fast rules whose sanction was never to be doubted were 
laid down by well-founded authority. People needed 
threats to make them toe the mark, if greed and personal 
advantage were not going to dethrone justice. That is 
why a central government must dominate the United States, 
for states as well as people can be selfish. This fact 
was obvious from the quarrels of Virginia and Maryland 
over the navigation of the Potomac, and from the advantage 
that New York and Pennsylvania took over New Jersey before 
the Federal convention of 1787. Such action based on 
personal gain spelt disunion, strife and war. It would 
make North America the happy hunting ground for older and 
better schooled foreign states. The stone·that would 
kill two birds, that would make for an unselfish relation-
ship at home and a united front abroad, was a well-regulated, 
l Beveridge, I, 302 
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well-respected, strong and efficient central or national 
government. 
The means by which such a government was established 
are a living tribute to the Constitution, the Founding 
Fathers and the genius of Marshall, the-Chief Justice. 
During the period of his chief-justiceship, from 1801 
until his death in 1835, Marshall delivered 519 opinions 
in the field of general law and 36 in the field of consti-
tutional law. These 36 constitutional law cases are like 
a strong rope made of 36 robust strands giving valiant 
support to an otherwise tottering national government. 
Master weaver that he was, Marshall wove the strands 
amidst the clamor of the opposition, reminding us of the 
scarlet Pimpernel! of French Revolution fame, who calmly 
watched the guillotining of the Fren~h Aristocracy dis-
guised as a peasant woman, yet all the while with great 
courage and skill, he plotted the rescue of his fellow 
aristocrats. 
The first strand of tightly-knit rope that has 
weathered political storms for nearly one hundred and· 
fifty years was the Marbury Case, which succeeded in 
establishing the fact that the Constitution is the 
supreme law of the land and secondly, that constitutional 
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interpretation ultimately rests with the Supreme Court. 
This latter point was not a new idea, as Charles Warren 
points out in his book, Congress, The Supreme Court and 
the Constitution. 2 He gives conclusive evidence that 
many of the leaders of the Federal Convention were of this 
conviction. But the Marbury Case established in practice 
the Supreme Court's right to pass on the constitutionality 
of a coordinate national branch, the Legislature. Con-
firming the Marbury Case was the Fletcher v. Peck Case 
wherein Marshall, in 1810, judged that the Supreme Court 
also had final authority when it came to a showdown between 
a state legislature and the Supreme Court 1n matters con-
stitutional. 
Two working principles, then, were the practical 
fruit of the Marbury and Fletcher v. Peck cases; that the 
Constitution is the supreme law of the land and the Jud-
iciary has the final decision in declaring whether the laws 
of a state of the nation are unconstitutional. These 
principles gave birth to a healt~offspring endowed with 
integrity, rather than a possible temJ:erarrental child that 
would yield to the impulse of the moment. 
In 1821, additional support was given to that already 
2 C. Warren, Congress, the Constitution and the Supreme 
Court, Little, Brown and co., Boston, 1925, 69 and 70. 
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robust principle of Judicial power in the case of Cohens 
v. Virginia. We note from this case that •the Judicial 
power of every well constituted gover.nment ••• must be 
capable of deciding every judicial question which grows 
out of the Constitution and laws•.3 This is so, for "the 
constitution and laws of a state, as far as they are re-
pugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States 
are absolutely void".4 
The Republicans were forced to accept the Marbury 
Case, and the principle on which the Fletcher·v. Peck 
Case was founded. At least they had to acknowledge that 
the Constitution was the supreme law of the land. How-
ever, they also had a theory on how to make this supreme 
law of the land as ineffective and inoperative as possible. 
One way was to establish the states as the interpreters 
of this supreme law, which the Kentucky and Virginia Re-
solves explicitly intended to do. But this plan was upset 
by the three cases just cited. 
The Republicans, however, fought hard tor their 
convictions and were as bent on undermining Federalism 
as Marshall was in building it up. So they came back 
strong with a principle, which, if success~ would tie the 
3 Cotton, I, 412. 
4 Ibid., 442 
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neatly woven strands of Ma.rshall' s constitutional eases 
in knots and render them useless. That principle was the 
"strict interpretation" of the Constitution leaving the 
door open to state supremacy. The National Government, 
they cla~med, had only those powers which the states had 
explicitly given it; all others were retained by the state 
governments. The Federal Government had no power, for ex-
ample, to establish a National Bank, because this power 
was not given explicitly by the Constitution. To set one 
up, then, was a usurpation of power, a stepping beyond the 
bounds of their rights. We have seen how Marshall made 
Hamilton's doctrine of implied powers live in the McCulloch 
case; yet he was ever on the alert to back up a great case 
and to prolong its spirit by bringing it back to life in 
new forms. In the Gibbons v. Ogden Case {1824), he re-
minded us of the hierarchy of political values. " ••• the 
acts of New York must yield to the law of Congress; and 
the decision sustaining the privilege they confer, against 
a right given by a law of the union, must be erroneous." 
Marshall knew that the integrity of a government depended 
on the proper subordination of inferior governments, and 
consequently he never tired of pointing out the proper re-
5 ~.,II, 62 
~--------------------------------------~ 
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lationship between the federal and the state governments: 
The nullity of any act, inconsistent 
with the constitution, is produced by 
the declaration that the constitution 
is the supreme law. The appropriate 
application of that part of the clause 
which confers the same supremacy on 
laws and treaties, is to such acts of 
the state legislatures as do not 
transcend their powers, but, though 
enacted in the execution of acknowledged 
state powers, interfere with, or are con-
trary to the law of Congress, made in 
pursuance of the constitution, or some 
treaty made under the authority of the 
United States. In every such case, 
the act of Congress, or the treaty is 
supreme; and the law of the state, 
though enacted in the exercise of p~wers 
not controverted, must yield to it. 
In this same case Marshall singles out the power of 
Congress to create a bank for the purpose of carrying on 
fiscal operations as a particular example of their general 
power to create corporations as "appropriate means of ex-
ecuting the powers of government". Long before the Chief 
Justice bad the opportunity to announce the doctrine of 
the Federalists on implied powers in a big issue like 
McCulloch v. Maryland, he evidenced his attitude on the 
subject in United States v. Fisher et al. in 1808, "Congress 
6 ~.,II, 63 
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must possess the choice of means and must be empowered to 
use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise 
of a power granted by the constitution".? 
part and parcel of the Nationalist tenets was the in-
sistence on the inviolability of contracts. The most 
famous case that had such great commercial significance 
was the Dartmouth College Case, already discussed in this 
paper. Marshall must have had the page that contained the 
words "No State ••• shall pass any Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts"8 thumb worn. He was convinced 
that the integrity of vested rights was a most fundamental 
principle of government and society, and that the preserva-
tion of such right• was an essential function of govern-
ment. He was aware that providing adequate safeguards 
for property and contracts against state legislatures was 
if not the most important, one of the most important 
tasks of the framers of the Constitution.9 It was 
Madison's conviction that interference with this sacred 
right of property was more influential than anything else 
in producing the convention of 1787.10 So naturally he 
was on the alert to discover in a case possibilities for 
7 Ibid., I, 45 
8 A;ticle I, Section 10, American Constitution 
9 Corwin, 147. 
10 .!2!!!.·, 148. 
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for establishing the integrity of vested rights and 1n 
the Fletcher v. Peck Case, in 1810, such conditions pre-
sented themselves. The state legislature of Georgia, in 
1785, had authorized the sale of 35 million acres of dis-
puted territory for $500,000.00 to four companies known as 
the Yazoo companies. With one exception, every man who 
signed the bill obtained rights in the granted land. In 
1796 the Legislature rescinded its previous act, pronouncing 
it null and void. In 1802 the claims ot Georgia over this 
same controversial territory were recognized and the 
land was no longer under dispute. A settlement was made 
and commissioners were appointed by Congress to settle the 
conflicting claims. Those of the Yazoo Companies were 
not even recognized. But the Yazoo organization, the 
majority of whose members came from New England, was not 
to be denied of what it claimed was its right. In 1809 
and 1810 the case came before the Supreme Court on a Writ 
of Error from the circuit court for the District of 
Massachusetts.11 
Professor Corwin tells us that Marshall could easily 
have disposed of the case before coming to the principal 
question. Among other outlets was the fact that the fraud 
11 Cotton, I, 228-231. 
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connected with the grant was notorious, the "most re-
sounding scandal of the generation 11 .12 Yet Marshall 
closed his eyes to the facts because they were rivoted 
on a possible constitutional issue involving the principle 
of vested rights. The dispute, as Marshall saw it, came 
to whether Georgia had the power to rescind a land grant 
made by a preceding legislature. Such a rescinding act 
was a violation of vested rights which in its broader aspects 
violated a fUndamental principle of society. The Chief· 
Justice stretched the issue of the obligation of con-
tracts and applied it to this case. For in a grant, he 
stated, there is an implied contract, to wit, the grantor 
implies by his grant that he doesnot intend to reassert 
his right to the thing granted. 13 More clearly in the 
following words he dismissed all doubt in the question: 
"When, then, a law is in its nature a contract, when 
absolute rights have vested under that contract, a repeal 
of the law cannot divest those rights•.l4 
Although the Sturges v. Crowninshield Case, delivered 
at the same time as the McCulloch v. Maryland, and the 
Dartmouth College Case, is sometimes referred to as 
12 Corwin, 152 
l3 Ibid. , 153. 
14-Cotton, I, 244. 
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"dangerous ambiguity", 15 Marshall is definite when speak-
ing of the obligation of contracts. He says that the 
•convention appears to have intended to establish a ~eat 
principle, that contracts should be inviolable".l6 
Again in New Jersey v. Wilson, Marshall declares the 
sanctity of contract. New Jersey had granted a portion of 
land in South Jersey to an Indian tribe, exempt from all 
taxation. When the Indians decided to move to New York in 
1800 to join "their brethern at Stockbridge", they applied 
for and obtained an act of the legislature authorizing 
the sale of their land. The land was sold in 1803 without 
anything being said about the taxation clause. Then in 
1804 the Legislature of New Jersey repealed that clause 
which exempted the land from taxes. The highest court of 
that state had justified the procedure of the legislature, 
but when the case was broughtbefore Marshall on a writ of 
Error, he reversed the decision, claiming that New Jersey 
could have insisted on a surrender of the tax provision as 
the sole condition on which-a sale of the property should 
be allowed--but she did not. Therefore, New Jersey impaired 
the contract and was in error. 
We have seen in this chapter how four fundamental 
I~ Corwin, 190 
Cotton, I, 297 
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conservative principles constituted the background for all 
the important constitutional decisions of John Marshall. 
T.he right of private contract, the Judicial right to 
interpret the Constitution and to pass on acts of Congress, 
and the precedence of the Constitution as the Supreme Law 
of the land were championed in theory by the leading con-
servative element in the Federal Convention of 1787, and 
were projected by Marshall into the warp and woof of 
routine American life. The same principles which character-
ized the Federalist Fathers in 1787, through the instrument-
ality of the Supreme Court Cases were now made the living 
tradition of a unified nation. The American Union, whose 
blood was beginning to thin in 1802 due to an overdose of 
political liberalism was gradually restored to its pristine 
purity by a series of planned Supreme Court decisions based 
upon these fundamental tenets of the Conservative Party. 
These decisions made our governmental eystem pulse again 
with the beat of national unity, even though it was robed 
in the gaudy garments of the Liberals. 
Burton J. Hendrick, in his book, Bulwark of the 
Republic, a biography of the Constitution, wonders if the 
task of forging the Constitution was not a lesser task 
than making the Constitution acceptable to the individual 
state conventions and the people. For instance, in New 
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York two-thirds of the Convention and four-sevenths of 
the people, according to Hamilton, were opposed to accept-
ing the new constitution.l7 We shall show in the next 
chapter how writings, like the Federalist Papers, during 
this momentous period of our history, along with the 
speeches in the conventions of New York, Virginia and 
Pennsylvania which were an elucidation of the minds of 
the leading members of the Federal Convention, were the 
chief source of material for Marshall's great decisions. 
Thus, an unbreakable chain, whose links were the Federal 
Convention, the documents in defense of the Constitution 
immediately after the close of the Federal Convention, 
and the Constitutional decisions of Chief JUstice Marshall, 
secured for the ages to come the political integrity of 
the United States. 
17 Hendrick, 98 
CHAPTER V 
THE MAIN SOURCES FOR MARSHALL'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS 
To appreciate more £ully how per£ectly Marshall 
grasped the spirit of the leaders of the Federal Convention 
o£ 1787, let us consider more in detail the writings o£ 
the men who were most influential in forming the Constitu-
tion and shaping the political thought o£ the Chie£ Justice. 
For behind John Marshall's constitutional decisions were 
great political principles for which he claimed no 
originality. He achieved the heighbof greatness in his 
own £ield, but that field was not the origins o£ £undamental 
political principles. Rather, his claim to fame was his 
uncanny faculty to use constitutional cases as a stepping 
stone to a greater national union, to apply sound political 
principles at the psychological moment, when their 
establishment was in dire need and seemed almost impossible. 
So, £or a clearer understanding of these political con-
victions, which caused Marshall to exercise such patience 
and courage in raising an almost lifeless in£ant to a 
healthy and sound manhood, let us see how the minds of 
James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton helped to £orm and 
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strengthen the Chief Justice's political principles. 
The task is not an easy one, for Marshall very rarely 
cited authority in his cases. Mr. Andrews, in his •works 
of James Wilson", notes that Marshall's greatest opinions 
are founded on the arguments of council before him, but he 
seldom stops to say "it was held" or "as council argued".l 
John Marshall would give an approving nod to the study of 
his source material. He was only too willing to disclaim 
any originality regarding purposes or tenets of the Fed-
eralist party. Professor Corwin tells us that Marshall 
did not originate the purposes of the Constitution: 
••• and no one would have been quicker than 
himself to disown praise implying anything 
different. He was thoroughly persuaded 
that he knew the intentions of the framers 
of the Constitution ••• and he was equally 
determin~d that these intentions should 
prevail. 
Which of the framers did Marshall call upon to help 
him decide his constitutional cases? That he knocked on 
Hamilton's door we know, for Mr. Hamilton is one of the 
few authorities the Chief Justice cited as a reference. He 
quoted directly from the Federalist, Which Cotton in his 
introduction to The Constitutional Decisions of John 
1 J. DeW. Andrews, I, 549 
2 Corwin, 122 
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Marshall, says was the "first authoritative interpretation 
of the Constitution and was mainly written by the two prin• 
cipal authors of that instrument".3 In the case of 
Weston v. Charleston, referring to the Federalist, Marshall 
used the words "thi's high authorityn.4 Again in McCulloch 
v. Maryland, he r.eferred to the same Federalist as "those 
excellent essays•. 5 Another of Hamilton's writings that 
profoundly influenced the judgments of Marshall was his 
Cabinet opinion, written in 1791, on the Constitutionality. 
of a National Bank. We shall also make reference to the 
speeches of James Wilson in both the Federal Convention of 
1787, his defense of the Constitution in the Pennsylvania 
State Convention ~ediately following the Federal Convention, 
and his speech in 1785 in defense of the right of Congress 
to incorporate a National Bank. In these documents we 
are going to track down those four principles which we have 
already shown to be the fundamental principles upon which 
the cases in this essay were decided, as well as the back-
bone of the Federalist party. These principles include 
the conviction that the source of all government authority 
rests with the people; that there are implied powers in the 
3 cotton, I, xliii. He has reference to Hamilton and Madison. 
~ Cotton, II, 273. 
Ibid., I, 343 
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Constitution and therefore the Constitution must be 
interpreted6 and interpreted liberally6 that the judiciary 
has the right to pass on the constitutionality of acts of 
Congress, and finally that the right of private contract 
is inviolable. 
First we shall consider the works of James Wilson, 
Scotch born American, lawyer, lecturer, signer of the 
Declaration of Independence, and one time Justice of the 
Supreme Court, who was one of the most influential speakers 
of the Federal Convention.6 No matter what speech you 
consult in the Convention of 1787, you will find Mr. 
Wilson interjecting somewhere his sentiments about the 
people as the source of all authority. He harped onthis 
point ~ nauseam, as if he had some great fear that6 should 
this fundamental political idea not become part of America's 
new government, all the work of the Convention would be in 
vain. Again in his defense of the Constitution in the 
Pennsylvania State Convention of 1787, Wilson expressed 
his mind on the importance of estaolishing the United 
States government on the people as the source of all 
authority; "the supreme powers therefore should be 
vested in the people is in my judgment, the great panacea 
6 M. Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 
11§11 Yale University Press, New Haven, 1911, III, 91 
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of human politics". 7. He realized that governmental powers 
must be considered and cautiously divided, but he insisted 
that the principle from which these powers flowed must be 
understood properly, if the Assembly was going to consider 
the new Constitution intelligently. Because the Constitu-
tion, that "great and comprehensive plan", conferred 
"streams of powertt, it was important to be able to "trace 
them all to one great and noble source, the people".8 
It was Wilson's idea, that the government of the United 
States was a government of the people .of the United 
States, and not a government of the states, as Jefferson 
intended. In order that this nation might function 
responsibility must hit every citizen directly, and not 
through the medium of a state government. For this reason, 
in Mr. Wilson's plan the state government assumed a sub-
ordinate position, whereas in Jefferson's scheme the in-
dividual state was independent of the Federal Gavernment.9 
On December 19, 1787, still defending the new Con-
stitution in the Pennsylvania State Convention, Wilson 
revealed a certain fear of tyranny and license. However, 
7 Ibid., 142 
8-J. B. McMaster and F. D. Stone, eds., Pennsylvania and 
the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788, Inquirer Printing 
and Pub. Co., Lancaster, Pa., 1888, 331. 
9 McMaster, 231. 
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by conferring adequate powers on a national government, 
this fear would vanish, so he. reasoned. This, of course, 
did not mean that the people lost anything by giving these 
adequate powers to the government, because sovereignty 
resided wi.th the people who only "let out" those powers 
considered necessary for the common good. after all it is 
the "power of the people" that "is the great foundation of 
the proposed system.nlO For the very existence of the 
new system "depends upon the supreme authority of the people 
alone."11 The sage diagnostician had placed his finger 
on the soft spot in our government's weakness during the 
days of the Confederation. "The people have been hitherto 
shut out of the federal government but it is not meant 
that they should any longer be dispossessed of their 
rights.nl2 
On July 24, 1788, Mr. Davie, defending the Consti-
tution before the North Carolina Assembly, substantiated 
Mr. Wilson's position on the importance of the •we the 
people's" part in the formation of the Constitution: 
The confederation derived its sole 
support from the state legislature. 
10 Ibid., 356 
11 Ibid., 302 
12 Ibid., 302 
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This rendered it weak and ineffective. 
It was therefore necessary that the 
foundations of this government should 
be laid in the broad basis of the 
people.l3 
Not only as a lawyer and political statesman did 
Wilson reiterate this principle of the sovereignty of 
the people, but later on as Supreme Court JUdge, under 
Washington's appointment, he insisted on the importance of 
the principle. In the Chisholm v. Georgia Case of 1793, he 
recalled the principle when he said: "Government belongs 
to the people of the United statesn.l4 
washington had great admiration for the intellectual 
talents of J~es Wilson. Perhaps it was while our first 
President heard his opinions on the position of the 
legislature, behind the closed doors of the Federal Con-
vention of 1787, or while reading his speeches in defense 
of the Constitution at the Pennsylvania State Convention, 
that made Washington think Wilson would serve his country 
well as a Supreme Court Judge. For in the Convention, 
Wilson eXpressed in so many words the principle that de-
cided the Marbury Case. "I say", began Wilson, "that 
under this Constitution the legislature may be restrained 
13 Farrand, 111 , 340 
14 Andrews, xvi 
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and kept within its prescribed bounds by the interposition 
of the JUdicial Department.nl5 In the same speech the 
question of the legitimacy of acts of Congress came up. 
Wilson met the question with a principle that runs through 
Marshall's decisions. It is precisely this statement that 
de Tocqueville says characterizes American democracy& 
But when it (an act of Congress) comes 
to be discussed before the Judges, when 
they consider its principles and find· 
it incompatible with the superior 
powers of the constitution; it is their 
duty to pronounce it void; and judges 
independent and not obliged to look 
to every session for a continuance of 
their salaries will behave with in-
trepedity and refuse to the act the 
sanction of judicial authority.l6 
To show that Mr. Wilson was not only revealing the 
position of the leaders of the Convention on this question, 
but stating the tradition in American Constitutional ex-
perience, we quote Mr. Gerry, speaking in the Federal 
Convention of 1787. He mentioned that it was customary 
in some states, from their earliest days to set aside 
laws because they were in opposition to the state con-
stitution or charter.17 This was not considered any 
usurpation for it was ftdone with the greatest approbationn.l8 
15 McMaster, 304 
16 Ibid., 304 
17 g;;-Introduction, iii 
18 Farrand, 1, 97 
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We have already indicated that political conservatism 
summed up the spirit of Marshall and the Federalist party. 
Yet it is to Mr. Wilson that we turn for tne most living, 
compact and most original exposition of that spirit. The 
document that we shall examine is Mr. Wilson's defense of 
the power of Congress to incorporate a National Bank. His 
speech was provoked by an act of the Pennsylvania Legis-
lature which repealed a former act throwing open its doors 
to the Bank. The famous Philadelphia lawyer denied the 
legitimacy of this act of repeal on the part of the 
Pennsylvania Legislature. He argued that laws of different 
kinds that involve incorporation, rights and properties, 
do not imply the same discretionary power to repeal. In 
this division of hi,s argument, Mr. Wilson reflects the 
whole spirit of the Conservative party: 
In a law respecting the rights and 
properties of all citizens of a 
state, this power may be safely ex-
ecuted by the Legislature. Why? 
Because in this case the interest 
of those who make the law (the 
members of the assembly and their 
constituents) is the same. It is 
a common cause and may be safely trusted 
to the representatives of the community. 
Nor can one hurt ,another without at the 
same time hurting himself. Very dif-
ferent is the case with regard to a 
law by which the state grants priv-
ileges to a congregation or society. 
Here two parties are instituted and 
two distinct interests exist. Rules 
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o£ justice, of faith and of honor must 
there£ore be established between them, 
for if interest alone is viewed, the 
congregation or society must always 
be at the mercy of the community ••• 
For these reasons and whenever the 
objects and makers o£ an instrument 
passed under the £orm of a law, are 
not the same, it is to be considered 
as a compact, and to be interpreted 
accordLng to the rules and maxims 
by which such compacts are governed.l9 
We quote this speech at length in order to bring out 
the very essence o£ Conservative doctrine which was a thorn 
in the side o£ Je££erson, and the most £undamental reason 
£or the decided split among men Who pro£essed to be cit-
izens of the same country. Wilson takes great pains to 
show how a common cause between the state and the cit-
izens can be "sa£ely trusted", £or "none can hurt another 
without at the same time hurting himsel£". But on the 
other hand, when two distinct interests con£lict "rules 
o£ justice, faith and honor must be established between 
them". This kind of spirit put the damper on democracy, 
smacked o£ monarchism, smothered human liberty and had 
to be scratched from the annals o£ American History, 
thought the Liberals. Yet this was the spirit Marshall 
was looking £or; this was the side Marshall wanted to 
£ight on, because it was the very pruning kni£e that was 
going to bring about a full blossoming American nation. 
19 Andrews, 567 
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John Marshall knew that if this country were to rise above 
petty state jealousies, this political doctrine of Mr. 
Wilson must permeate her statutes. 
To conclude Mr. Wilson's contribution to the decisions 
of John Marshall, we quote once more from the National 
Bank speech of 1785, regarding acts of incorporation which 
is the best single quotation that reveals the core of the 
Federalist spirit: 
••• To receive the legislative stamp of 
stability and permanency, acts of in-
corporation are applied for from the 
legislature. If these acts are repealed 
without notice, without accusation, with-
out hearing, without proof, without for-
feiture, where is the stamp of their 
stability. Their motto should be Levity. 
If the act for incorporating the sub-
scribers to the Bank of North America 
shall be repealed in this manner, a 
precedent will be established for re-
pealing in the same manner every other 
legislative charter 1n Pennsylvania. 
A pretense as specious as any that can 
be alleged on this occasion, will never 
be wanting on any further occasion. 
Those acts of the state, which have 
hitherto been considered as the sure 
means of privilege and of property, 
will become the sport of every gust of 
politics, and will float wildly back-
wards and forwards on the irregular and 
impetuous tides of a party and faction ••• 2o 
Next to James Wilson, Marshall was especially 
guided by the writings of Alexander Hamilton. One of the 
2o Andrews, 567 
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most important cases in American Constitutional History 
is the case of McCulloch v. Maryland. This case was de-
cided on the principle of L~plied powers which Hamilton 
was the first one to advocate.21 It appeared in his 
Cabinet Opinion, addressed to W~shington in 1791, on 
the constitutionality of a National Bank. The President 
had already received the opinions of Mr. Jefferson, his 
Secretary of State, and Mr. Randolph, his Attorney 
General, on the matter. Both had denied the power of 
Congress to create such a corporation. Washington sent 
both arguments to Hamilton so that he might put down the 
positive arguments as clearly as possible. It was Hamilton's 
rebuttal of the Liberal party's position that caused 
Washington to approve of the Bank. 22 
Washington had a foretaste of the future battles 
between the Federalist and Republican parties when in 
1791 he read the letters of Hamilton, Jefferson and 
Randolph on the constitutionality of a National Bank. 
If he had lived to hear the case of McCulloch v. Maryland 
his mind would have flashed back to the correspondence of 
1791 when he was the judge of whether the strict or the 
21 A. c. Lodge, 111, 493. 
22 ~., 493 
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broad interpretation was more consistent with the spirit 
of the Constitution. And now in 1819, Marshall carried 
on the tradition of both Hamilton and washington in his 
decision, first by expounding the implied powers theory 
after the model of Hamilton's cabinet Opinion, and then 
by judging as WaShington did, in favor of the implied 
power theory. 
Hamilton, one time student at King's College, showed 
that he had absorbed the substance of scholastic philosophy, 
the backbone of the curricula, not only at King's College, 
but at all the colleges and universities during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centunes in this country.23 
The oft repeated philosophic dictum medium ~ finem was 
the general principle employed by Hamilton in discoursing 
on the implied powers of the Constitution. The question 
at issue was the power of Congress to form a corporation. 
This question fell under the broad aspect of proper re-
lationship of means to an end. Does the corporation to 
be erected have a "natural relation" to any "objects or 
lawful ends" of the government. Since the government has 
"sovereign power to regulate a thing", it has the right 
23 J. J. Walsh, Education of the Founding Fathers of the 
Republic, Fordham University Press, New York, 1935, ix 
and 184. 
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to rremploy all the means which relate to its regulation to 
the best and greatest advantagen.24 
John Marshall based his argument for the legality 
of a National Bank on precisely this same fUndamental 
philosophic argument. He remarked that it was a matter of 
human prudence and in conformity with the spirit of the 
framers of the Constitution that Congress in order that it 
might be able to execute its great powers expeditely, 
should have any means at its disposal which might be 
appropriate and conducive to the end. To favor the 
opposite interpretation that Congress's powers were to be 
executed according to a strict legal code would be to 
change entirely the character of that instrument.25 
Jefferson argued from the elastic clause of the Con-
stitution which reads: "The Congress shall have power to 
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all 
other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government 
of the United States or in any Department or Officer 
thereof", 26 against the establishment of a bank and 
claimed the National Bank was neither necessary nor proper. 
24 Lodge, 111, 450 
25 Cotton, I, 314 
26 Article It section 8, Last paragraph of the Constitution 
of the un1ted States of America. 
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No means were necessary, Jefferson contended, but those 
"without which the grant of the power would be nugatoryn.27 
Such an argument from Jefferson's pen caused Hamilton to 
go into a discussion of the significance of the word nec-
essary. Arguing against such a restrictive use of the 
word necessary, Hamilton claimed that neither the grammatical 
nor the common use of the word justified such an inter-
pretation. According to both these criteria, "necessary" 
often meant no more than "needful, requisite, incidental, 
useful or conducive to". He insisted, too, that the 
entire 'elastic clause' indicated that it was the intention 
of the framers of the Constitution to give "a liberal 
latitude to the exercise of specific powers•.28 Hamilton's 
quill must have moved at a faster clip when he retorted: 
To understand the word as the secretary 
of State does would be to depart from 
its obvious and popular sense, and to 
give it a restrictive operation, an 
idea never before entertained. It would 
be to give it the same force as if the 
word absolutely or indispensably had 
been prefixed to it.29 
Marshall again modeled his argument after Hamilton's 
Cabinet Opinion when he took up the significance of the 
27 Lodge, III, 452 
28 Ibid., 453 
29-~., 453 
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word "necessary" in the McCulloch v. Maryland Case. 
His cri.teria for correct usage were "the common affairs 
~ 
of the world" and "approved authors". According to these 
criteria we discover the word 'necessary' frequently 
"imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or 
useful or essential to another".30 In the general accepted 
use of the term, to use the means necessary to an end is 
understood as "employing any means calculated to produce 
that end and not as being confined to those single means, 
without which the end would be entirely unattainable".31 
Hamilton wrote in 1791 of the •great latitude of 
discretion" that a government needed in selecting and 
applying means to an end. By this he showed that he was 
not sitting in an ivory tower, for a government must be 
able to act, and act efficiently, if it is going to serve 
the common good. Marshall revealed the same practical 
spirit by insisting on the importance of a legislature's 
need to "avail itself of experience, to exercise its reasons 
and to accommodate its legisl~tion to circumstance.s".32 
Many other kindred~assages could be -cited to show 
30 t Cot on, I, 
31 Ibid., 321 
32-
Ibid., 323 
321 
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Marshall's thorough familiarity with Hamilton's Cabinet 
Opinion and its profound influence in such a case as 
McCulloch v. Maryland. For example, look at the striking 
similarity in Hamilton's criteria of what is constitutional 
in his Cabinet Opinion, and Marshall's criteria in McCulloch 
v. Maryland. Hamilton, writing about the doctrine of im-
plied powers claimed that the criterion of constitution-
ality is "the end to which the measure relates as a means". 
He goes on to say: 
If the end be clearly comprehended 
without any of the specified powers, 
and if the measure have an obvious 
relation to that end, and is not 
forbidden by any particular provision 
of the Constitution, it may safely 
be deemed to come within the compass 
of national authority.33 
Whereas Marshall says in the McCulloch v. Maryland: 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be 
within the scope of the Constitution 
and all means which are appropriate, 
which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consistent 
;~~~ti~~ti~~t=~ea~~n=~~~!~i~!ai~g4 
It has already been mentioned that Hamilton through 
the Federalist influenced the judgment of Marshall. In 
33 Lodge, III, 458 
34 Cotton, I, 329 
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the Federalist, number 78, the one time Secretary of the 
Treasury, attempted to clarify the spirit of the Fed-
eral Convention on the position of the Judiciary in our 
national government. He wrote that the "interpretation of 
the laws is the proper and peculiar providence of the 
courts• and must be regarded by the Judges as a fundamental 
law11 • 35 Just as Jefferson visioned the states as the bul-
wark of democracy, Hamilton envisioned the courts of justice 
as the •bulwark of a li~ited constitution against legislative 
encroaehments.•36 caught by this sound political spirit 
of Hamilton which fitted in so perfectly with his ow.n 
personal experience with human nature, Marshall adopted 
these principles and made them the basis of his constitu-
tiona! decisions. 
35 H. c. Lodge, The Federalist, 485 
36 Ibid., 487 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
There were many elements during the first fifty 
years of our nation's life that entered into making the 
American States a United States. The first and greatest 
of all was the Constitution itself, a political master-
piece, a compromise of wants and needs that showed posterity 
that more than anything else the framers of the Constitu-
tion wanted a Union. Big states and small states, agri-
cultural states and non-agricultural states, states with 
navigable rivers and states without navigable rivers, slave 
states and non-slave states, after four months of heated 
debate, finally agreed to live as one nation, according to 
the provisions of the Constitution. This was triumph 
number one in the evolution of the great American nation. 
Not to be overlooked however were the succeeding steps 
that led to practical political unity in this country. 
The battle to ratify this written document was almost 
as hard fought a victory as its framing. The clarification 
of ideas through the Federalist, the courageous and un-
daunted exposition of constitutional concepts in the 
State Conventions of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts 
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and New York, by men like James Madison, James Wilson and 
Alexander Hamilton overcame almost insurmountable odds 
and opposition. 1 
Yet the job was only beginning when the ninth state 
ratified the Constitution. The valiant defenders who 
opposed "consolidated government" and backed a loose 
confederated government along the lines of the Articles 
of Confederation were not to undergo a sudden change of 
heart. This group, the backbone of the Republicans, 
picked up power when the nation was but a babe in arms. 
Jefferson and Randolph and Breckenridge, master politicians 
and leaders, had plans to substitute their own child for 
the i~fant of the Constitution, before the very eyes of 
its guardian and protector, the Federalist party. 
It was John Marshall who rallied to the defense of 
the Federalists when he thwarted the plans of the 
Jeffersonians by incorporating the fundamental tenets 
of the Federalists into the legal tradition of the Courts, 
the •bulwark of democracy". That he knew the spirit of 
the Federalists has been shown by his own constitutional 
decisions and the writings of the leaders of the Federal 
1 Beveridge, 1, 323 and Hendrick, 96-99 
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Convention of 1787. 'f.hat he loved the principles of the 
Federalists has been brought out by the dangers of im-
peachment he faced in deciding the Marbury Case, and the 
abuse and criticism he knew he would have to accept in the 
Dartmouth College and Fletcher v. Peck decisions. 
Because of his understanding, and faith in the tenets 
of Federalist doctrine, because he was convinced·of the 
salutary nature of their philosophy as far as the life of 
the American Nation was concerned, John Marshall exercised 
the greatest courage and judicial statesmanship in foster-
ing our country from infancy through adolescence up to 
wholesome manhood. Referring to this judicial statesman-
ship, Professor Corwin concludes his scholarly treatment of 
the Chief Justice's part in Constitutional History with 
the following encomium: 
••• he formulated, more tellingly than 
anyone else and for a people whose 
thought was permeated with legalism, 
the principles on which the integrity 
and ordered growth of their nation 
have depended. Springing from the 
twin rootage of Magna Carta and the 
Declaration of Independence, his 
judicial statesmanship finds no 
parallel in the salient features of 
its ach~evement outside our own 
annals. 
2 Corwin, 231 
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